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The Dutch Jewish Community: Betwixt and between politics, 
medicine, and religion 
 
 
Should we then be so foolish as to believe that the abolition of a little sucking is 




In the above citation, Berisch Berenstein, son of the late Chief Rabbi Samuel 
Löwenstamm, challenges the new medical knowledge that sucking the infant’s blood 
with the mouth after the circumcision (meẓiẓah) posed a health threat. In the nineteenth 
century, Jewish circumcision became a contested site between the maskilim, who 
wanted to reform Jewish religion and society, and the traditional rabbinate. The 
maskilim urged the professionalization of the Jewish circumciser and simultaneously 
criticized what they regarded as dangerous and uncivilized aspects of the Jewish ritual. 
Rituals concerning the Jewish body were under scrutiny and were condemned for their 
barbaric appearance as well as their possible health threat. The Jewish ritual was not 
only redefined in medical terms but also condemned for its indecorous appearance.  
This chapter analyses how discourses on ‘elevating the Jews’ became entangled 
with discourses on medicine and reforming Jewish rituals as well as the meaning this 
entanglement produced. Jewish rituals were no longer confined to the realm of the 
rabbinate but became a matter of national health, subjected to government control. 
Various Jewish responses can be identified in this process, ranging from lip-service to 
essentializing contested rituals to subordinating religious authority to secular 
knowledge. Two reforms in particular stand out, namely the reforms of Jewish burial 
and circumcision. Both rituals show how government policy and maskilic endeavor 
contributed to the redefinition of Jewish rituals. Underlying this religious change was 
the entanglement of discourses on morality and medicine that portrayed the Jewry as 
internally and externally sick. This in turn laid the foundations for the late-nineteenth-
century representation of the Jew as a biological threat.  
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1. The Jewish burial controversy  
The burial controversy is a good example of the entanglement of religion with political 
and medical discourses, and it became a locus of power struggles on the authority of 
religion. The burial controversy attracted all of the leading Jewish intellectuals of that 
time. It started in 1772, when Duke Friedrich von Mecklenburg-Schwerin issued a 
decree delaying the burial of the dead for three days. He was influenced by the 
orientalist Olaf Gerhard Tychsen, who argued that the Jewish custom of early burial was 
not grounded in the Jewish classical sources but based on “non-authoritative kabalistic 
works.”2 The edict prohibited the Jewish custom of burying the dead preferably on the 
day of death.  
The burial controversy was a cultural campaign between proponents and 
opponents of the Enlightenment. It became a maskilic showpiece, and almost every 
known maskil contributed to this debate in writing. The burial controversy constructed 
the classic binary between the maskilim and the orthodox, where rabbis held on to old 
traditions, proving their argument with Talmudic reasoning, and the maskilim placed 
their faith in science and reason. According to John Efron, “the crucial issue at heart of 
maskilic medical texts was the battle to wrest control of the Jews’ bodies from traditional 
Judaism and its representatives, and to place control in the hands of the scientifically 
trained, and socially superior.”3 A vivid correspondence between the Jewish scholars 
Moses Mendelssohn and Jacob Emden (1697–1776), who were asked by Schwerin´s 
Jewish community to intervene, shows this classic opposition clearly, as both discredited 
each other for either ignorance or apostasy. According to Moses Mendelssohn, “no 
absolute criterion of certain death” existed, and therefore he recommended waiting until 
the signs of decomposition appeared. Because the early burial was conditional in his 
view, it could be postponed, for instance for the purpose of acquiring burial essentials 
such as a coffin or a shroud. Mendelssohn supported his argument with a Mishnah 
tractate, which stated that the deceased were placed in caves and catacombs before 
interment and watched for three days in a row for any possible signs of life.4   
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Jacob Emden, however, accused Mendelssohn of atheism, since for Mendelssohn 
contemporary medical knowledge outweighed religious authority.5 Moreover, 
Mendelssohn’s compliance created a precedent for abrogation of Jewish customs if they 
conflicted with scientific knowledge. Emden feared this reasoning so much that even the 
possibility of saving a life (piquah nefesh), a rule of thumb in Jewish law, was set aside.6 
This is not to say that Emden did not endorse science; in fact he gleefully proclaims, 
“Verily, natural sciences are different. They certainly constitute a permitted and 
commendable body of knowledge, necessary to observe the plan of the Lord and His 
great deeds which are wondrous.”7 However, when medical knowledge differed from 
rabbinical opinion, the latter should prevail.8 In this respect, the discussion between 
Emden and Mendelssohn reveals the power struggles over the new discursive 
entanglement between religious and medical discourses.  
When kabbalistic ideas entered the debate, this juxtaposition between the 
traditionalists and the maskilim became even more pronounced. According to Rabbi 
Ezekiel Landau of Prague, prolongation of burial caused the soul to linger, extending 
torment and suffering. He referred to the midrashic statement that “the first three days 
the soul hovers over the body, ready to return; when the face has undergone 
decomposition, the soul departs.”9 This kabbalistic view of the hovering soul appalled 
the maskilim because it was based on a mystical tradition and not on reason. The 
delayed burial served as a test case for the tenability of traditional and kabbalistic 
Judaism; according to the proponents, rabbis could either comply with science and 
modernity or remain insular with their perverted customs.10 The maskilim employed 
fear to motivate the change of the burial ritual, which was surprising because they 
accused the rabbinate of frightening Jews into believing.11 The use of fear in promoting 
delayed burial counters the claim of the secularization thesis, where scientific 
explanations diminished the role of religion as fear no longer substantiated belief.12 Here 
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it was the other way around; scientific discourses produced, fostered, and cultivated 
fear.  
 
Reform of Jewish burial in the Netherlands 
The fear of being buried alive was widespread and motivated Moses Mendelssohn to 
note his desire for delayed burial in his testimony. Although the burial controversy 
appeared to be a cultural campaign between the maskilim and the rabbinical elite, in the 
Netherlands it was not the burial itself that created the problem, but rather the 
entanglement with discourses on the ´elevation of the Jews´ that made it a contested 
ideology. For instance, the Sever Minhagee Amsterdam, a compilation of Jewish religious 
practices in Amsterdam from 1716 to 1901, already mentions the custom of delayed 
burial in 1788. It says that when the deceased wrote in his/her will that he/she is not to 
be touched for 48 hours after his/her passing way, his/her wish should be observed and 
honored, thus leaving an opening to personal interpretation of how the burial ritual 
should be executed.13 In comparison to the German maskilim, leniency toward the burial 
ritual soothed the Dutch maskilim on this issue.  
Moreover, the Ashkenazi community commonly practiced delayed burial, since 
the more affluent cemetery at Muiderberg (1642) was a one-day journey from 
Amsterdam, and despite the fact that Jews who passed away on holidays or on Fridays 
could be buried at the nearby cemetery at Zeeburg (1714), designated for guests, 
children, and the poor. At Zeeburg there was a special row for affluent and important 
Jews, so that even in death they could maintain their status amongst the poor. Despite 
this alternative, many Jews bought their graves at Muiderberg.14 Already in 1758, 
relatives of the deceased could suspend the funeral if the deceased mentioned a 
preference for Muiderberg in their will.15 Sometimes the parnasim even used delayed 
burial to settle the deceased’s debt to the community. By refusing to allow the funeral to 
take place, they tried to force the defaulter to pay or the sinner to repent. A dramatic 
example of this is the parnasim´s refusal in 1740 to bury the deceased child of Tsadok 
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Abraham as long as Abraham refused to pay his debts to the community.16 As such, 
postponed interment was commonly practiced in the Dutch Ashkenazi community, 
albeit not only for medical or scientific reasons; prestige, distinction, and occasionally 
force also motivated the delay.  
Because of this familiarity with delayed burial, the naye kille challenged the 
unequal burial practices of the Ashkenazi community instead of invoking the horrors of 
delayed burial.17 In its Diskursn, for instance, it displays the classical binary by praising 
its own sophistication in opposition to the alte kille´s chaotic and cruel burial rituals. 
Thus, in one of the Diskursn’s fictional polemical plays, the maskil Anshel explains to his 
ignorant friend Gumpel that in the naye kille a doctor confirms every death before burial.  
 
Yes, brother. That is a rule in the naye kille. Not as it is with you. In the past a child 
died in the Kayzer family on a Friday or on the eve of a holiday, I believe, at three 
o’clock and at six it had already been wrapped [in shrouds]. Away with it! If a poor 
man had done that, [they would say he was] only [trying] to save on the shive and 
shloushim. And I know for certain that people often die [needlessly] because someone 
says that they’re dead and they’re then taken away. Where else does the name “Lipkhe 
the dead” come from?18  
 
According to Anshel, the alte kille officials not only buried people alive, but also got away 
with shortening the mourning period because their actions were positively valued, in 
contrast to the poor man, whose actions were judged as selfish. Moreover, Anshel 
accused the alte kille of oppressing the poor with their faulty and malicious customs.  
Familiarity with delayed interment was probably one of the reasons why the 
parnasim and the rabbinical elite complied with the implementation of a Dutch law from 
1815 requiring the dead to be buried only after 24 hours; indifference characterized 
their response. The law ordered that “no corpse could be interred before 24 hours have 
elapsed, [and then only] after the official confirmation of death by a medical doctor. 
Relatives of the deceased are permitted to delay the burial but never to advance it.”19 
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This dispositive continued the policy of King Louis Napoleon, who based his decree on 
Carel Asser´s plan to reform the Dutch Jewry. Carel Asser’s plan and its proposed laws 
reflected the naye kille’s earlier demands, including reorganization of the 
slaughterhouse, ritual baths, early burial, etc.20 Because Asser presented the plan as a 
political program, the historian Joseph Michman deduced that it was “typical for the way 
in which the Enlightenment was pursued in The Netherlands, where the pressing nature 
of social problems permitted reformers only the most vicarious discussion of religious 
and philosophical issues.”21 Not surprisingly, King Louis Napoleon made a similar 
argument when he stated that he did not want to alter the essentials of the Jewish 
religion, as “this would be entirely opposed to our sentiments, which are inclined toward 
doing nothing that might offend the fullest freedom of conscience.”22 The discursive 
entanglement of discourses on citizenship, Jewishness, and ´the Jewish question´ 
blended and produced a new a meaning of what it entailed to be a Jew and an inhabitant 
of the Netherlands. In this new attribution of meaning, the essentials of Jewish religion 
clearly excluded the visible and ceremonial aspects of religion.  
Jewish physicians, such as Immanuel Capadoce (1751–1826) and Stein (1778–
1851), like their German colleagues, initiated the promotion of delayed burial.23 As 
members of the High Consistory, they enforced the implementation of the new burial 
legislation diligently. However, they met fierce resistance from within the Jewish 
community. In 1818, Capadoce bitterly reports:  
 
…in some Jewish communities all of the deceased, whether from age, illness, or 
sudden deaths, who could be apparent deaths, received the same treatment of 
immediately closing the mouth with a bandage and placing heavy weights on the belly 
to prevent it from inflating. This is done before or shortly after 24 hours, and the 
corpses are put in coffins which are nailed shut, depriving the apparent dead of their 
last breath by killing them, as it was so unfortunately done in earlier days.
24  
 
Despite Capadoce’s efforts to reform this ‘faulty’ custom, Jews were buried before 
sunset. Although financial incentives and haste rather than religious objection 
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compelled some Jews to disobey the delayed burial regulation, the focus here will be on 
theological rejection.25 Especially in The Hague, which in 1824 with the settlement of the 
Lehren family there became the bulwark of orthodoxy, Chief Rabbi Lehmans challenged 
the regulation to wait 24 hours before commencing the funeral rituals, such as the 
closure of the mouth with a bandage and the placing of a sand sack on the corpse’s belly 
to prevent it from inflating. Lehmans regarded the latter funeral rituals as religious 
regulations, which were therefore required. Moreover, the rituals did not hamper or 
hinder the potential awakening of an apparent death.26 Lehmans’ response shows the 
refusal to abandon what he regarded as essential aspects of the Jewish religion.  
In a response to Lehmans’ refusal, Capadoce went to great lengths to prove 
Lehmens’ theological misinterpretation. According to Capadoce’s reading of the Talmud, 
the Bible, and the Shulkhan Arukh,27 the Supreme Committee’s regulation was in 
accordance with Jewish law and refuted Lehman’s religious objection. Capadoce 
challenged Lehmans’ religious authority by showing his lack of knowledge of Jewish 
law.28 Capadoce’s response resembles the maskilic critique of the ignorance of the 
rabbinate and the wish to work within the boundaries of Jewish tradition. Lehmans, in 
return, challenged Capedoce´s medical authority by denying that the old burial rituals 
were life-threatening. Both men obviously disrespected each other´s expertise. With 
their refusal to compromise, the Supreme Committee sided with Capadoce and 
dismissed Lehmans´ demand.29 
Many Jews apparently neglected the new burial regulations, causing the creation 
of additional procedures. There are, for instance, signs that The Hague ignored the new 
burial regulations, as the published burial regulations of Sefer Haim Lanefesh in 1876 
mention the prohibition of closing the mouth and placing a sand sack on the belly on the 
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Sabbath, implying that on other days it was a common procedure.30 To supervise the 
precise implementation of the new burial regulations, only the parnas president was 
entrusted with a key to the cemetery. Moreover, a state representative supervised the 
proper execution of the ritual. In 1837, a civil servant needed to approve all death 
certificates before the funeral or burial rituals, and the certificates had to include the 
confirmation of time of death by a physician.31  
Closely following the current ideas in the Netherlands with regard to elevating 
the masses, the call for decorum, and the creation of a moral citizen, the maskilic 
criticism also concentrated on the visible features of Jewish burial.32 They associated 
clean and decent clothing with moral behavior, and they pointed their criticism in 
particular at conspicuous rituals that attracted waves of spectators, such as the funeral 
procession. With the split between the naye and the alte kille, the new community was 
already boasting of their sophisticated funerals. Thus, in one of their Diskursn they 
proudly describe the orderly and tasteful burial ceremony of a child from the Vezep 
family.  
 
Everything went in an orderly way. The shrouds were  [sewn], the ritual cleansing of 
the body was done in time and on Monday morning at eleven o’clock…the funeral took 
place. The gaboim of the kabronim read the names of all the members of the khevre of 
the kabronim: six people in order to carry, three in front and three behind, all in black 
coats and three-cornered hats. Then they went slowly with the corpse from the 
Prinsengracht to the Portuguese synagogue. There the carriage stood. The shames of 
the kabronim went ahead and after him the gaboim with the manhig-hakhoudesh. 
What shall I say? They walked so sedately that it was a pleasure to watch. All along the 
way, it was swarming with people.
33  
 
This funeral was in all ways exemplary of the maskilim’s point of view on death, with the 
burial taking place on their newly acquired cemetery in Overveen (which was also for 
children), the delayed burial, the determination of death by a physician, and above all 
the elevated manner.  
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The implicit critique of the alte kille’s burial ceremony was part of a larger 
negative evaluation of the power of the khevre kedishe (the burial society). Those 
societies, mostly made up of prominent Jews, arranged all the funerals in the 
community, provided the poor with shrouds, took care of the cemetery, and ritually 
cleaned the corpses. According to the maskilim, the khevre kedishe usurped their power. 
The chaotic ceremonies characterized their mismanagement. In fact, the khevre kedishe 
and the parnasim symbolized usurpation and oppression; they contradicted the 
enlightened ideals of morality and refinement. Or as a High Consistory member bitterly 
declared in 1813: “burial among the Israelites is not only humiliating and against proper 
order, but is also very costly; the privileges and the arrangements of the burial society 
are absurd and abhorrent to the current manners.”34 
The maskilim felt ashamed of the Jewish funeral rituals in comparison to the 
Christian funeral rituals, and they tried to reconcile the Jewish routine to ‘current 
manners’. High Consistory member Stein hoped that reforming Jewish burial ceremonies 
would contribute to a more positive appreciation of Judaism and would make Jews 
worthy citizens. His response shows the discursive entanglements between citizenship 
and Jewishness. Moreover, reform of Jewish burial provided him with an opportunity to 
subordinate religious authority to secular knowledge. “It is true that the defects of our 
education and the chaos during the burial ceremonies are probably the two main causes 
of the contempt our fellow-believers receive in the eyes of the Christian inhabitants of 
this nation.”35 With the French occupation, the maskilic ideas of appropriate undertakers’ 
clothing finally got a foothold. The royal decree of 1814 not only prohibited burial 
within 24 hours, it also ordered that burials should take place with “dignity and order.”36 
Accordingly, the new burial regulations of the Amsterdam khevre kedishe in 1816 
ordered that “all carriers of the bier and escorts wear a nice black cloak, a white jabot, a 
three-pointed cocked hat, and black socks and shoes.”37  
The shifting constellations blurred the boundaries between the state and religion. 
As a result of this shift, the burial of the dead was not only dictated by the norms of 
religion but had become a state concern. Discursive strands such as protection 
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transferred from the religious realm to the state, legitimizing the dispositive of the law 
on delayed burial. Now the state protected the Jews against the horror of being buried 
alive. As a result of this encroachment on religious authority, the state came to 
determine the prerequisites of the Jewish funeral. Moreover, the dispositive of the 
delayed burial also established and produced the discourse of the Jew as backward, 
uncivil, cruel, and in dire need of reform. As such, this issue of delayed burial reveals 
how the boundaries between the secular and the religious are not fixed but are 
constantly renegotiated.  
 
2. Criticism of Jewish circumcision 
Another custom wherein fear and concern for national health legitimized the state´s 
interference with the Jewish religion was Jewish circumcision. For centuries, 
circumcision had been criticized as a barbaric and therefore a forbidden ritual. Although 
critiqued and outlawed, the ritual remained important in Judaism and survived the ages 
as a sign of the covenant between God and Abraham’s offspring. During the 
Enlightenment period, circumcision was once again under attack, in particular the last 
two steps of circumcision established by the rabbis, namely the periah (opening), which 
separated the foreskin from the glans more rigorously, and the meẓiẓah or the sucking 
up of the infant’s blood.38 The physical and bloody aspects of the ritual appalled ‘rational 
society’ and became entangled with notions of hygiene and contamination. Adding to the 
criticism was the new scientific discourse on circumcision, which regarded it as 
unauthentic and an adopted custom of the Egyptians. These new insights quickly spread 
from the English Deists to Voltaire, questioning the Jewish basis and tenability of the 
ritual.39 If circumcision was ‘essentially’ not Jewish, it could be abandoned, and this 
physical but hidden barrier between Jews and other citizens of the nation could finally 
be abolished. In this view, circumcision was not a divinely ordained law, but a 
meaningless adoption of a local custom.  
The underlying problem of circumcision was that it stressed Jewish particularity 
and therefore conflicted with the all-inclusive aim of Enlightenment ideas and its 
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discourses on the universal concept of humanity. Consequently, many maskilic Jews, 
especially in Germany, tried to reconcile Judaism with modern times by removing any 
references that might show a double loyalty. As a result, the maskilim eliminated 
allusions to the Temple and the coming of the messiah in Jewish prayer books. Various 
Reform communities likewise removed customs that, in some eyes, contradicted the 
Enlightenment ideal of rationality.40 However, most of the intellectuals of the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums hesitated to publicly object to circumcision. Moreover, 
reformers like Zunz and Geiger regarded circumcision as an inextricable part of Judaism. 
For instance, Geiger only privately describes the ritual as “ein barbarisch blutiger Akt” in 
a letter to his friend Zunz.41 This was contrary to Holdheim, who openly objected to 
circumcision because he regarded it as an “expression of an outlived idea” and 
emphasized personal consciousness instead, thus opposing circumcision “on 
principle.”42 In this changing climate of reconciling Judaism to modern times, some 
German maskilim refrained from circumcising their infants, while still expecting them to 
be members of the Jewish congregation.43 As such, the power struggles over religious 
authority resulted in a plethora of responses regarding the tenability of such a 
conspicuous identity marker as Jewish circumcision.  
 
Dutch reform of Jewish circumcision  
Reform of circumcision followed a different path in the Netherlands. There was no 
intellectual opposition, such as that from German maskilim, to circumcision. An 
exception was Spinoza, who acknowledged the value of circumcision as a preserver of 
Jewish identity, but nevertheless rejected the Jewish claim to be the only people chosen 
by God and thus refuted the idea of Jewish particularism.44 Moreover, there are no 
known cases of Jewish parents refusing to allow their children to be circumcised while 
still trying to get them admitted as congregants.  
The reform of circumcision was partly due to Dutch governmental involvement. 
The occurrence of accidents during circumcision compelled and legitimized 
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circumcision legislation. For instance, in 1819 a complaint about a mohel (circumciser) 
came from the city of Delfzijl in the northeast of the Netherlands. This mohel, named 
Noortje, was very young and apparently lacked the skills to perform the circumcision. 
Mohel Noortje circumcised an infant crudely and consequently the second step of the 
circumcision, the periah, failed, causing the infant great agony and pain. Eventually 
another, more experienced circumciser redid the periah.45 Another report about a 
wrongly executed circumcision came from the city of Leek, which is also in the north of 
the Netherlands. This mohel, named Engers, circumcised an infant poorly and severely 
injured him; his recovery took 14 days, and it remained uncertain whether the child 
would overcome this faulty surgery at all. Apparently, Mohel Engers’ circumcision skills 
were extremely poor, and instead of only cutting the foreskin, he removed a piece of the 
penis as well.46 Lack of experience caused by the relatively small Jewish communities 
probably contributed to the overrepresentation of circumcision accidents in the 
countryside.  
These reports from the countryside compelled the government to establish a 
circumcision commission. However, this government control was not one-sidedly 
imposed; in fact, Jewish physicians, such as Bromet, Stein, and Capadoce, fostered and 
suggested it. Regulation of circumcision was a joint effort between the government, 
which wanted to protect its Jewish citizens, and the physicians, who because of their 
background and their medical knowledge considered circumcision to be a medical 
procedure. The physicians, not the mohelim, had the authority on matters concerning the 
body. By exposing the mohelim’s ignorance and incapacity, as the accidents clearly 
proved the danger of traditional techniques, the physician’s superiority was established. 
With the many circumcision accidents, the physicians convinced the government to side 
with them in their quest. Because one of the state’s objectives was health care and thus 
the well-being of its citizens, the maskilic objectives as well as the new government 
concern complemented each other well. In the transformation of the state from 
caretaker to caregiver, the government and the Jewish physicians became hand-in-glove 
in the matter of reforming circumcision.  
Unfortunately, there are no records of the number of incidents. Therefore, it is 
extremely difficult to judge the urgency of this preventative measure. Were the accidents 
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incidents or were they structural? Nevertheless, the faulty circumcisions were the 
accepted reasoning behind measures introduced not only in the Netherlands but also in 
the German lands. A Frankfurter law from 1843, for instance, dictated that circumcisions 
could only take place under medical supervision.47 In the Netherlands, the perceived 
danger compelled King Willem I in 1820 to install a circumcision commission, 
supervising, controlling, and examining all mohelim in order to prevent any accidents 
happening out of ignorance and/or inexperience.48 These new regulations were widely 
endorsed by the maskilim and met with indifference from the rabbinate. The 
commission included five persons: the president of the commission, three mohelim, and 
one physician, who was also a member of the provincial medical committee. The 
physician was the only non-Jew in the commission, and therefore it appeared to be an 
entirely Jewish matter, albeit under government control. A further distinction was made 
between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, because their differences in culture and 
liturgy and their reluctance to cooperate with each other meant that each had their own 
circumcision commission. The same circumcision regulations, however, applied to both.  
The Dutch circumcision regulations made circumcision a state-approved and 
controlled procedure. The first article prohibited circumcisers under the age of 20, in 
order to prevent the entrance of incompetent youngsters into the profession. 
Inexperience was probably the reason why the circumcision by Mohel Engers turned out 
to be so disastrous for the reproductive organs of the infant. It also became mandatory 
to observe at least eight circumcisions.49 In this way, the new mohel would familiarize 
himself with the execution of a proper circumcision, instead of cutting away what 
appeared to be a foreskin. The circumcision law connected age with experience, as it 
assumed that an older person had observed more circumcisions. In this line of thinking, 
coupling age and experience enhanced the craft of surgery; circumcision was not 
fulfillment of a religious obligation but a skill acquired during medical training.50 
The laws professionalized the craft of circumcision. Circumcision was only 
permitted to be performed by mohelim in possession of a diploma, which could be 
obtained after successfully completing a theoretical and practical examination. The 
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theoretical part tested the anatomical, medical, and religious knowledge of an aspiring 
mohel.51 During the practicum, the aspiring mohel performed a circumcision under 
scrutiny of the commission, showing them his ability by executing an accident-free 
procedure. This indicates how religious knowledge was no longer sufficient and 
authoritative enough on its own; it needed to be complemented with secular knowledge. 
Although religious knowledge was still part of the examination, the medical elements 
outweighed it, as the central position of the practicum shows.  
However, this last measure, the compulsory exam, was only applicable to 
newcomers. Experienced mohelim appointed by the Jewish community received a 
diploma without having to pass an exam.52 This article in particular, which did not 
require an examination for circumcisers already working in the community, does raise 
the question of how often the whole procedure actually went wrong. Moreover, the non-
compulsory exam for working mohelim countered the claim that the exam was intended 
to stop further circumcision accidents from happening out of ignorance and 
inexperience. If this was the only motivation, it would be even more reason to examine 
the current working mohelim as well. Moreover, there were complaints against both 
young and old mohelim. The new circumcision law was probably intended as more of a 
preventive health measure than to stop an abundance of clumsy mohelim from 
mutilating young infants. It was the idea of a possible botched circumcision, supported 
by various stories about incompetent mohelim and injured infants, that was already 
powerful enough to reform the profession. 
The physician’s prominent role further emphasized the diminishing authority of 
the mohelim. It was exemplary of the maskilic wish to subordinate religious authority to 
secular knowledge. Before commencing a circumcision, an official physician checked the 
infant´s health and ascertained whether the surgery could endanger its life. Only after 
his approval was circumcision permitted. Because of the prominence of the medical 
authority, the circumcision ritual was secularized. It was placed under government 
control and subjected to state law, which criminalized and punished circumcision 
without a permit. Moreover, the bureaucratization of circumcision provided it with the 
appearance of acceptance and made it a state-approved ritual, while the emphasis on the 
formal aspects of circumcision, such as certificates and examinations, further diminished 
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its religious meaning. Laws, regulations, and protocols all necessarily incorporated the 
Jewish ritual and made it into a national affair.  
 
Critique of meẓiẓah  
In addition to the professionality of the circumciser, the method of the act was also 
criticized, especially condemning the last two steps, the periah and the meẓiẓah. The last 
step, the sucking of the infant’s genitals, attracted a wave of criticism. Meẓiẓah was 
barbaric, unhygienic, and lethal. The whole controversy surrounding meẓiẓah centered 
on two points of critique. Firstly, the image of a mohel sucking the blood from the 
infant’s genitals invoked horror, repulsion, and disgust. The idea of an elderly mohel 
with a blood-spotted beard conflicted with the image of a rational and civilized religion. 
Secondly, the fear of contamination through the mohel´s infectious saliva was reason for 
concern. According to current medical discourse on contagious diseases, meẓiẓah could 
be lethal. Numerous cases were known, especially in the German lands, of infants being 
infected with contagious diseases such syphilis, herpes, and tuberculosis. In 1811, the 
physician Johan Nepomuk Rust in his work Helkologie oder über Natur, Erkentniss und 
Heilung der Geschwüre links the deaths of recently circumcised infants with the meẓiẓah 
as a transmitter of syphilis.53 Infections caused festering abscesses, great agony, and 
eventually the infant’s death, making the procedure not only barbaric in its appearance 
but also in its outcome.  
The meẓiẓah controversy followed different paths in each European country. 
Around the year 1844, both France and the German countries abolished the ritual. 
Criticism of the meẓiẓah came from many sides: from within the Jewish communities, 
from the maskilim, from physicians, from the government, and even one orthodox rabbi 
considered it an unnecessary procedure. The great scholar Haham Sofer, the authority of 
orthodox Jewish scholarship, ruled that the meẓiẓah could be replaced with a sponge if 
the expert physicians “will testify faithfully that the sponge performs the same action as 
meẓiẓah by mouth; nothing else needs to be considered, in my opinion.” According to 
Sofer’s reading of the Talmud, the meẓiẓah was not “a necessary condition for the 
validity of circumcision,” and “it is not necessary to be stringent if the physicians have 
invented other remedies in its place.” Only kabbalists, he writes, clung to the practice 
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because they ascribed a special mysterious meaning to it, but “we do not deal with 
hidden things when there is any reason to suspect danger.”54 For Sofer the meẓiẓah was 
clearly not an essential part of the circumcision, nor was it a Talmudic law, as other 
treatments such as placing bandages and cumin were also proposed; it was intended as 
a health measure. Therefore, he permitted replacement by equally beneficial remedies. 
For Sofer there was no hidden secret or intention in the meẓiẓah; it was practical and 
straightforward, to the benefit of the child, and if those benefits disappeared, so did the 
obligation to perform it. Because meẓiẓah was a medical remedy and not a religious one, 
the decision to either allow or abrogate it was left to the physicians.  
   Later nineteenth-century orthodox scholars opposed Sofer’s leniency and 
instrumental approach toward the meẓiẓah. They regarded any alteration or slight 
reform of Jewish rituals to be a threat to Judaism. For instance, Rabbi Ettlinger (1798–
1871) passionately warned, “Examine how far things will go if you decide in favor of the 
scientists’ view over what we have received from the sages of the Talmud.”55 Moreover, 
instead of stressing Sofer’s pragmatism, his saying that “everything new is forbidden by 
the Torah,” was used to reject any adjustment of Jewish law or custom to modern society 
out of hand. They responded by essentializing contested Jewish rituals. Some orthodox 
scholars went out of their way to excuse his previous leniency or to prove the 
responsum’s fraud. Sofer’s students and family members, Rabbi Ettlinger, Maharam 
Schick (1807–1879), and other orthodox scholars regarded Sofer’s former leniency as a 
result of the pressure of previous authorities and the fear of a total abolition of 
circumcision. However, as the opposition between the orthodox and Reform 
communities increased during the nineteenth century, the controversy had become a 
battleground between innovators and traditionalists, and meẓiẓah’s abolition came to be 
seen as the harbinger of other religious reforms. Therefore, orthodox scholars regarded 
his ruling as invalid, since Sofer would prohibit in hindsight any alteration of the 
circumcision ritual. Moreover, he would have ferociously defended the meẓiẓah out of 
fear that its abolition would ultimately lead to the destruction of Judaism.56 
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  The reinterpretation of meẓiẓah as a biblical commandment further enhanced its 
necessity. Complicated pilpul (casuistic reasoning) now replaced Maimonides’ medical 
arguments in order to expose its biblical origin. For instance, Rabbi Judah Asaad from 
Hungary, which had become the cradle of the ultra-orthodox movement at the end of the 
nineteenth century,57 considered meẓiẓah to be an essential and indispensable part of 
the commandment to circumcise. “Moses certainly received the law at Sinai in this form, 
aside from the reason of the danger mentioned in the Talmud... and so according to the 
secret meaning, meẓiẓah by the mouth is certainly a commandment and is required.”58  
In addition to Sofer´s reconciliation of Jewish practices with new insights, Jews 
exploited the available technical knowledge to circumvent the meẓiẓah ritual. From 
pumping devices to simple glass tubes, various invented tools prevented direct physical 
contact between the mohel and the infant. For instance, Rabbi Michael Cahn from Fulda 
found the solution in a simple pipe, and Alexander Tertis of London, who tried to be in 
line with the requirements of Maimonides “to extract the blood from remote parts,” 
invented a rubber pump as a substitute for sucking with the mouth. Various German 
orthodox rabbis approved both devices. This was in contrast to the Eastern European 
rabbinate, which held a rigid and kabbalistic view of the matter that prevented them 
from agreeing with any modifications to the circumcision ritual. Although the technical 
inventions appeared to be examples of the supremacy of medical authority, the new 
devices actually stressed an orthodox point of view because they substituted for the 
mouth and thus preserved the ritual of meẓiẓah. Moreover, the devices stressed the so-
called medical benefits and confirmed meẓiẓah’s religious foundation. Their mode of 
response was the exploitation of secular knowledge in order to maintain the traditional 
structures. The technique served here as orthodoxy’s handmaiden.  
Others emphasized the medical benefits of meẓiẓah and futilely attempted to 
battle the scientists on their own territory as they employed medical discourse to 
support their religious claims.59 They tried to prove the validity of Maimonides’ ruling 
that meẓiẓah should be performed “in order to prevent danger.”60 Retrospectively 
ascribing health benefits to religious commandments also characterized other contested 
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rituals, such as ritual slaughter and the Jewish dietary laws.61 As such, meẓiẓah was only 
one of the many Jewish rituals stretching the boundaries between the medical and 
religious realms.  
 
The meẓiẓah controversy in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the meẓiẓah controversy had a relatively late reception. Contrary to 
the German countries and France, where the state abolished meẓiẓah in the 1840s, the 
discussion in the Netherlands started in 1864. The Supreme Committee for Israelite 
Affairs requested from all of the Dutch chief rabbis a theological justification for meẓiẓah 
and asked whether the procedure could be replaced, for instance by rinsing off the blood 
with lukewarm water. Their request was a result of the recommendations of the North 
and South Holland provincial committees of health research to find a substitute for 
sucking with the mouth. Although the health commission initiated the request, the 
government only played a minor part in it, as the separation of church and state in 1848 
restricted their authority in religious affairs.62 However, the perceived health threats of 
meẓiẓah legitimized the government’s summoning of the rabbinate. In the case of 
circumcision, the separation between church and state was not so clear cut. Minister of 
Justice Olivier supported and financially facilitated the initiative but refrained from 
intervention, as the “government tried to hold on to the principle of refraining from 
interference in church affairs.”63  
The immediate cause for the concern of the provincial health committee and the 
Supreme Committee for Israelite Affairs was a complaint from 1856, where several 
infants died after being circumcised. A certain mohel from Den Bosch was accused of 
having a contagious disease, which he passed on to the infants with his saliva during 
meẓiẓah. According to the accusations, this mohel, named Lewyt, caused several deaths 
in the community. A father writes dramatically of how his son suffered severely from his 
circumcision. In 1849 Mohel Lewyt circumcised his son, but his son’s wounds did not 
heal. His son’s slow recovery compelled him to visit two doctors. They both blamed his 
son’s poor medical condition on an infection caused by meẓiẓah. In a desperate attempt 
to stop the infection, the doctors cauterized the stricken parts of his son’s genitals. After 
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this second extremely painful operation, his son was ill for the following ten months, 
while the parents expected that the boy would succumb to his illness at any moment. 
However, to their great surprise, he recovered from his injuries. This case was not 
incidental; Mohel Lewyt was accused of many other disastrous circumcisions. 
Consequently, Chief Rabbi of Den Bosch Lehmans suspended him.64 
 However, Mohel Lewyt blamed the parents for the infants’ sudden deaths, and he 
regarded the accusations as slanderous and malicious. He maintained that he had many 
contented customers and that the parents had neglected and ignored their infants. 
Lewyt recalls a case where the mother of twin boys left with one child to sell goods 
door-to-door in Belgium only two weeks after giving birth, while she gave the other 
child into the care of a “strange women of low descent.” Apparently, this baby got ill and 
died.65 Because of the high infant mortality rate during the nineteenth century, it is 
extremely difficult to pinpoint who was responsible for the death of these infants. 
Almost a quarter of the babies born did not reach the age of one year.66 Therefore, the 
cause-effect relationship is uncertain.  
The Dutch Rabbinical Committee of 1864, however, regarded meẓiẓah as 
beneficial to the child’s health. In a series of assemblies, nine chief rabbis from the 
Netherlands discussed the halakhic status of meẓiẓah and their willingness to reform it. 
What followed was a philological discussion, resembling the discussion in the German 
countries and Eastern Europe, wherein they addressed the question of whether meẓiẓah 
could be replaced by any other ‘medical’ remedy, but not the question of whether 
meẓiẓah was an inextricable part of circumcision. Although two of the rabbis, Rabbinical 
Assistor Hirsch of Amsterdam and Chief Rabbi Landsberg of Maastricht, forthrightly 
questioned its necessity, their effort died a quick death because none of the other rabbis 
even considered it to be open to discussion.67 Meẓiẓah was apparently unanimously 
regarded as a fundamental aspect of circumcision.  
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  The rabbinical committee was initially divided into two camps: the moderate and 
the strict orthodox. Soon the balance tilted in favor of the latter, outnumbering the 
moderates. Only Chief Rabbi Hillesum of Meppel, Chief Rabbi Landsberg of Maastricht, 
and Chief Rabbi Lehman of Nijmegen proposed a reform of the ritual. However, they 
sustained their arguments differently. According to Hillesum, the root of the word 
meẓiẓah (הציצמ), moz (ץומ ), not only meant sucking with the mouth but also squeezing 
with the hand, as can be found in different places in the Bible and the Talmud. 
Furthermore, Chief Rabbi Hurwitz of Vienna and Haham Sofer both allowed the use of a 
sponge as a replacement of meẓiẓah.68 Landsberg, on the other hand, emphasized the 
ritual´s purpose instead of the method. He denied the Talmudic basis for sucking with 
the mouth and claimed that it could be replaced with lukewarm water.69 Lehmans also 
agreed with the preservation of meẓiẓah and stressed that “with even the slightest doubt 
of danger he strongly advises substitution.” However, he falsely claimed that he had 
never personally experienced any danger in meẓiẓah.70 Lehmans was clearly short of 
memory, since he could not recall his dismissal of the mohel Lewyt in 1856.  
The chief rabbi of The Hague, son of the late Samuel Berenstein, opposed their 
instrumental view of meẓiẓah. Berisch Berenstein strictly adhered to a literal reading of 
Maimonides’ passage, while stressing that “the church was separated from the state” and 
therefore “it could not force him to act against his will.” Moreover, “as long as the 
physicians disagree, the state could not take health measures.”71 Berisch Berenstein 
feared most of all that leniency endangered the existence of circumcision and 
emotionally declared, “If we give in, than the periah will be next.”72 Unlike his father’s lip-
service strategies, Berenstein rejected any change to the Jewish rituals.  
Berisch Berenstein mentions four arguments for the preservation of meẓiẓah. 
First, the slippery slope of change as the end of Judaism. If a single thing was changed, it 
set a precedent; other reforms would follow, and would therefore herald the end of 
Judaism. This argument was often heard in orthodox circles, and it justified a strict 
adherence to tradition, or what was thought to be traditional. According to Moshe 
Samet, it was strict observance “[w]ith respect to the mitzvoth [pious deeds], including 
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insignificant customs, stringent measures, and preventative measures whose underlying 
justifications are at best unclear” that characterized this “new historic innovation.”73  
The second argument was the inclusion of meẓiẓah in the Shulkhan Arukh.74 
Orthodox scholars denied the historical development of halakhic reasoning, and in an 
attempt to freeze “the traditional way of life” they boosted the Shulkhan Arukh as the 
new legal codex. Instead of constantly reinterpreting customs and legal references, one 
collection of customs became authoritative. Because the Shulkhan Arukh mentioned 
meẓiẓah, it was an essential part of circumcision  
A third argument referred to the authority of Maimonides´ saying “until the blood 
is sucked from the remote parts.” According to Berenstein, 1,000 years of meẓiẓah 
tradition proved its value. “What else could it be than with the mouth?” asked Berisch 
Berenstein rhetorically, as he dismissed out of hand other options and ways of 
extracting blood. Later on, he further elaborates on the connection between history and 
Maimonides´ statement to prevent danger: “This is אדו [known], and if we propose 
another procedure than meẓiẓah, we would not have the certainty of the prevention of 
הנכס [danger], and this will remain a אמש [unknown fact].”75 Berenstein refrained from 
asking why the “drawing of the blood from remote parts” prevented danger. Nor did he 
accept the physicians’ reports about the outbreak of contagious diseases among recently 
circumcised infants as proof of meẓiẓah´s health threat. Even if Berenstein had known 
that Maimonides’ saying most likely referred to the Hippocratic system of the four 
humors, wherein infections were explained by stagnated and decayed blood, he still 
would have adhered to his point of view, because the words themselves had become 
simultaneously purpose and proof. 
 For his fourth argument, Berisch Berenstein used four testimonies from 
professors of the faculty of medicine at the University of Würzburg, published in the 
orthodox journal The True Guardian of Zion, who all testified to meẓiẓah´s medical 
benefits.76 By explicitly referring to those testimonies, he employed modern medical 
knowledge to sustain his orthodox point of view. Apparently, the physician’s medical 
claim about the mohel’s contagious saliva needed to be dismissed on scientific grounds. 
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Their mode of response was to exploit secular knowledge to legitimize traditional 
rituals. It showed the ambivalence of the orthodox, that their dream to cast out 
everything new was an idealistic construction that even they could not uphold; it was 
the paradox of orthodoxy. 
Chief Rabbis Hirsch, Vaz Diaz, Dusnus, Isaacsen, and Ferrares followed 
Berenstein’s argumentation closely, as they declared more or less that the whole point of 
meẓiẓah was to prevent danger. It was a health measure, written in the Talmud and 
explained by Maimonides, who was after all a physician. Meẓiẓah was always meant to 
be done with the mouth, as the roots of ץומ dna , הצמ,צצמ  all have the same connotation, 
namely sucking with the mouth. Failure to perform meẓiẓah threatened the life of the 
child, as according to Vaz Diaz, “ulcers, sores, and vesicles occurred without the 
practice.”77 Meẓiẓah became indispensable in fulfilling the commandment of 
circumcision. Even though it was initially installed as a health measure, it was given the 
status of minhag because of its long usage. Without this third step, the circumcision was 
not kosher and thus unsafe for the child.  
Consequently, the rabbinical committee decided that meẓiẓah was not dangerous 
and could not be abolished or replaced by a sponge. However, they made a small 
concession by adding that whenever there is a suspicion of danger, the mohel and the 
father should first consult a chief rabbi, who in his turn would consult a physician.78 With 
this last amendment, the committee of rabbis preserved the ritual and their strong 
alliance to orthodox thought without having to succumb to reform. If there was any 
danger, then they could always revoke their decision while still upholding their 
orthodoxy. This pragmatic approach to religious observance within an orthodox frame 
of thinking was typical for Dutch Jewry. It was the striving for accommodation, or what 
Bart Wallet has called “the Dutch inclination towards the middle (‘de Hollandse 
middelmaat’).”79 
However, to view the discussion of the meẓiẓah controversy within this 
framework only disregards the innovative elements of it. Meẓiẓah not only stopped the 
bleeding, it had become a crucial part of the commandment to circumcise, elevated from 
a medical remedy to a minhag and even considered by some to be a biblical 
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commandment handed down on Mount Sinai. Moreover, even though the Talmud never 
explicitly stated that meẓiẓah was done with the mouth, it was assumed to be a valid and 
necessary way to do it, if not the sole way: the health benefit of meẓiẓah was now 
theologically interpreted. Hence, not only did medical knowledge encroach on the 
religious ritual, but a former medical requirement was also transformed into a religious 
rule. Jews responded to the pressure on meẓiẓah by condemning it as unhealthy, by 
employing medical knowledge to defend it, or by exploiting the technical aspects to 
maintain it. Clearly the interchange between theology and medicine was more complex 
than it appears at first sight, partly due to shifting boundaries and the renegotiation of 
authority, which far surpassed a simple dichotomy between the religious and the 
secular. Eventually the custom did die out, but only gradually and not because of state 
interference. A short revival of the controversy at the end of the nineteenth century in 
the journal Nieuw Israelitisch Weekblad (New Israelite Journal) undoubtedly contributed 
to its rejection by the Jewish majority.80 
 
3. Conclusion 
As a consequence of the advances in medicine and national health care, the medical and 
religious spheres were renegotiated. The entanglement of discourses on medicine, 
religion, and ‘the Jewish question’ produced the idea of the Jews as a health threat. This 
in turn legitimized state interference when Jewish practices could threaten public health 
with their gloom of incivility and dirtiness. Thus the clothing of the pallbearer was 
formalized, circumcision was professionalized, and early burial was banned. These 
dispositives redefined the Jewish religion in medical terms. Medical discourse, however, 
extended beyond the boundaries of hygiene and blended with discourses on etiquette 
and morality. These entanglements attributed a new meaning to the Jew as both 
internally (morally and religiously) as well as externally (dressed in rags) unhygienic. 
The reforms targeted a mixture of religious practices in an attempt to halt the spread of 
disease. The Jew needed to be educated and reformed, not only for his own sake, but 
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also for the sake of public health. The medical concept of hygiene legitimized state 
control and the criminalization of certain religious practices.  
Reform of religious rituals became a locus for power struggles and generated 
several modes of response within the Jewish community. It was not the proposed reform 
but rather the attack on their authority that aroused the rabbinate’s opposition; 
religious leniency was therefore only pronounced when it did not challenge the 
orthodox rabbinate. In a response to the pressure, orthodox opposition essentialized the 
contested rituals, such as early burial and meẓiẓah, and presented them as the 
traditional identity markers. Moreover, they explicitly employed scientific knowledge to 
sustain, legitimize, and maintain traditional religious structures. The maskilim, on the 
other hand, seized the opportunity of religious reform to gain power to the detriment of 
the rabbinate by subordinating religious authority to secular knowledge. However, 
these are the extreme angles of the modes of Jewish response. Betwixt and between, 
paying lip-service to reform, maintaining the traditional structures, and simple 
indifference to religious change had the upper hand. Both the orthodox and the maskilim 
employed secular and religious discourses to sustain their own take on Judaism. Their 
employment of the same strategic moves is yet another example of how the boundaries 
between secular and religious discourse are an ideological construct. 
 
  
